The Washington, Jefferson & Madison Institute is excited
to be launching a symposium on Thomas Jefferson this month. We have
invited many different brilliant historians and scholars to participate by
contributing an original brief essay on founding father, Thomas Jefferson.
Please enjoy the essays as they are published and continue the civic
conversation about the principles and documents of the American founding, in
this case, related to Thomas Jefferson, by sharing and discussing with your
friends. The following inaugural essay of the series, "The Hamiltonian Presidency of Thomas Jefferson," was written by Stephen F. Knott.
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Thomas
Jefferson characterized his election to the presidency as the “revolution of
1800,” an event that was “as real a revolution in the principles of our
government as that of [17]76.” Twelve years of Federalist (or in the case of
John Adams, neo-Federalist) government had betrayed the American Revolution with
policies designed to favor British interests abroad and apply British governing
principles at home. Jefferson promised to restore the spirit of 1776, prompting
fears among the Federalists that Jefferson would destroy the fragile national
institutions created since the adoption of the Constitution.
One
prominent Federalist leader dissented from this view and predicted that Jefferson’s
administration would be characterized by moderation and restraint. “If there be
a man in the world I ought to hate it is Jefferson,” Alexander Hamilton noted,
but he went on to urge Federalist members of Congress to support Jefferson’s
selection over Aaron Burr in the disputed election of 1800. Jefferson, Hamilton
believed, was far more principled than Burr, and would not dismantle the institutions
built by the Federalists. According to Hamilton, Jefferson would act in a
restrained manner as chief executive. This restraint was rooted in a calculation
– a cold, political calculation – that caution, not zealotry, would be the key
to maintaining his popularity. In Hamilton’s view, Jefferson was not “zealot
enough to do anything in pursuance of his principles which will contravene his
popularity or his interest. He is as likely as any man I know to
temporize, to calculate what will be likely to promote his own reputation and
advantage; and the probable result of such a temper is the preservation of
systems, though originally opposed, which, being once established, could not be
overturned without danger to the person who did it.”
Hamilton’s
assessment of Jefferson turned out to be accurate, for Jefferson left
Hamilton’s financial system in place, including the hated national bank of the
United States. Much to the distress of the Old Republicans including die-hards
such as John Randolph of Roanoke, Jefferson did not attempt to overturn the
Judiciary Act of 1789, nor did he disband the navy, a move supported by the Old
Republicans since navies were seen as tools of imperialism. Jefferson
appointed relatively moderate jurists to the Supreme Court and did not push for
constitutional amendments limiting the power of judicial review or restricting
the ability of the federal government to invoke “implied” constitutional powers
to expand their authority.
In
one important sense, however, Hamilton underestimated Thomas Jefferson. While
Jefferson’s rhetoric suggested that he would defer to the
people and to their elected representatives in Congress, President Jefferson
was very much an “energetic executive” of the type Hamilton celebrated in The Federalist Papers. This was
particularly true in the arena of foreign and defense policy. The newly elected
president went out of his way to appear to be acceding to the demands of
Congress, all the while manipulating the legislature through his “hidden hand
presidency.” One can see this at work in his celebrated Louisiana Purchase, and
in his war with the Barbary Pirates, where the Sage of Monticello aggressively
pursued these “nests of banditti” in the Mediterranean, providing great leeway
to his naval commanders to take the offensive while assuring Congress that the
navy was operating in a restrained, defensive manner. Jefferson even authorized
the first covert operation designed to overthrow a foreign head of state (the
Pasha of Tripoli) again with limited and at times disingenuous information
provided to Congress. Jefferson spent unappropriated funds during the war scare
with Great Britain in 1807 after the confrontation between the HMS Leopard and the USS Chesapeake, and he responded to the foremost
national security crisis of his second term, the embargo of 1807-1809, in a “more
draconian [manner] than anything attempted by British authorities throughout
the years leading up to the American Revolution.” Jefferson wanted to “crush” those American citizens who
dared violate his embargo by running contraband across the border with Canada.
Jefferson’s presidency, ironically, presents a classic example
of an energetic executive who formulated and implemented American foreign
policy with little congressional input and no judicial involvement. Jefferson
even went so far as to endorse the controversial notion of executive
prerogative power in a manner that would have made Alexander Hamilton blush.
Jefferson argued that in times of emergency the president could act where the
law was silent, or in extreme cases, act against the law in the name of
necessity. Jefferson noted in 1807, “on great occasions every good officer must
be ready to risk himself in going beyond the strict line of the law,” and he
added that there were “extreme cases where the laws become inadequate to their
own preservation, and where the universal recourse is a dictator, or martial
law.” For Jefferson, “a strict observance” of the rule of law was “one of the
high duties of a good citizen” but it was not the highest duty. “The laws of
necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of a
higher obligation.” And, he added, in a lesson lost in our increasing
legalistic, process obsessed nation, “to lose our country by a scrupulous
adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty,
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing
the end to the means.”
Thomas Jefferson was an assertive president; the very type prescribed
by Hamilton in The Federalist Papers.
Granted, this fact is concealed beneath layers of Jeffersonian rhetoric, and obscured
by the mythological accounts of Jefferson’s presidency promoted by historians
with an agenda. The fact remains that despite their deep disagreement on many
issues of their day, Jefferson and Hamilton shared a firm belief in the importance
of an energetic executive.
Stephen F. Knott is a Professor of National Security Affairs at
the United States Naval War College and the author of Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth (2002).